Interesting article...

Here's another great article I found. This subject is a complicted one that has very serious implications. East Asian stability is at question in the years to come and I'm going to try to stay at the forefront of the matter while I'm here and hopefully later in life. It's funny how easy it is to discover such a modern day problem that effects millions, yet unless you look for it, you very easily could never know about it. This is why we need to read newspapers my friends.


South Korea must choose sides
By Corey Richardson

Rumors of a substantial drawdown or complete withdrawal of US Forces Korea (USFK) have been around for decades. After years of a South Korean administration generally hostile to US regional objectives and priorities, perhaps the rumors are finally becoming a reality. That would be a tragedy for both sides.

If the US were to leave Korea, how would US influence in the region be altered? How would Korea's relationships with China and Japan change? What about the strengthening US-Japan alliance? What if North Korea collapsed? These questions have largely escaped critical consideration in the current debate.

Despite President Roh Moo-hyun's stunning obliviousness to political and security realities, South Korea would be particularly vulnerable without USFK, or even with a token force left in place. For its part, the US cannot realistically expect to maintain or improve its ability to exert regional influence by leaving Korea.

Like US Forces Japan (USFJ), America's Korean contingent helps prevent conflict by acting as a strong deterrent for any nation that might consider military actions or threats, at the same time moderating the responses of the host nation in tense situations. Obviously, the original purpose of the US-South Korea alliance was to counter the North Korean threat. However, as that threat has waned, a more important, diplomatically incorrect mission has evolved in addition to deterring North Korea: ensuring stability among China, Japan and Korea.

The North Korean threat is nonetheless the reason for the majority of South Korea's defenses, even if Seoul won't say so in defense white papers. No conventional military calculus suggests the possibility of a North Korean victory in a second Korean War, but a weaker South Korean military could cause Pyongyang to miscalculate. South Korea's defenses must remain strong.

Regional tensions, but stability

Even with USFK in Korea, issues from the region's long and often confrontational history cause tensions to flare. Chinese claims that Koguryo, an ancient ethnically Korean kingdom whose territories extended into present-day China, was in fact a Chinese kingdom have raised Korean hackles on several occasions. The move is viewed as the possible groundwork for justifying a Chinese invasion of the northern half of the peninsula, perhaps to "help" a North Korea on the verge of implosion, or after collapse.

China's plans to register Mount Baekdu (Changbai in Chinese) as a Chinese historical site with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Geopark list was also viewed as a possible prelude to claiming North Korean territory. The mountain, sacred to both sides, straddles the border. A 1962 agreement between the two countries split ownership of the mountain.

This view is bolstered by the fact that China prefers to retain border buffer zones and would not relish having a reunified Korea, potentially with US forces just across the Yalu River. South Korea could not prevent China from sending troops into North Korea, and the US likely would not risk war with China over North Korea. Japan's colonial domination of Korea from 1910 to 1945 has left a deep and bitter resentment in both Koreas that is apt to provoke emotional and drastic responses.

One high-profile manifestation of this is the decades-long dispute over the ownership of some relatively insignificant islets in the waters between the peninsula and the archipelago, the Liancourt Rocks. Known as Dokdo in Korea and Takeshima in Japan, South Korea has stationed a Coast Guard contingent on the island since 1954 to enforce its claim. Both nations claim the area as a part of their exclusive economic zones (EEZs).

In 2005 South Korea scrambled fighters to intercept a civilian Japanese Cessna aircraft nearing Dokdo airspace. When Japan announced plans to conduct a hydrographic survey of the area, South Korea made vague threats alluding to possible military action against the research vessels. Japan backed down.

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's numerous visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, dedicated to Japan's war dead including some convicted war criminals, have raised diplomatic tensions with both South Korea and China on several occasions, including a temporary recall of South Korea's ambassador in Japan.

Ripe for an arms race

South Korea wants to be the "hub" of something in East Asia, and it may finally have its chance, thanks to the Roh administration. The current US-South Korea situation is a case of "be careful of what you ask for because you might get it". Even so, the psychological impact on South Korea of a significant USFK departure likely would not be immediate but should not be underestimated. A massive reduction of US troop levels and capabilities could have the same effect as a complete withdrawal on Seoul's planning processes. It might begin with regretful concern, but could quickly become panic.

At this point it should be noted that even if the USFK withdraws from Korea, some sort of collaborative security agreement will remain in place. However, South Korea's perception of America's commitment to security on the peninsula is the decisive factor in how it will react to real and perceived threats. What are now relatively minor disagreements with Japan and China would take on a more serious dimension.

Without USFK, South Korea would need to vastly increase its defense budget to make up for functions long taken for granted. With American forces on its soil as a safety net, South Korea didn't have to be overly concerned with being attacked or invaded. Many Koreans would perceive that era over. Another factor is the closer US-Japan security partnership, which causes both China and South Korea concern. Some in the South Korean defense sector are undoubtedly jealous of the relationship Japan enjoys with the US. Japan would also need to take into consideration a South Korea without the moderating influence of USFK, although the role of USFJ in Japan would reduce much concern.

In such an environment it's not unthinkable that a few minor skirmishes could occur, between South Korean and Japanese navel vessels in the vicinity of Dokdo, for example. This would be the slow start of a regional arms race, with Korea and Japan joining China's ongoing buildup.

A reunified Korea could go nuclear

North Korea is the wildcard. If in the next few years reunification were to occur - through a North Korean collapse, the death of Kim Jong-il, or a possible but unlikely mutual agreement - South Korea would suddenly find itself straddled with the enormous cost of integrating North Korea. These costs would dwarf the already massive increase South Korea would have been undertaking in defense spending, something it would clearly be unprepared and unable to accomplish while maintaining its defense investment. A Korea faced with an economic dilemma of such magnitude would find maintaining its conventional military forces at current levels impossible. At the same time, it would feel more vulnerable than ever, even with US security assurances.

For a nation paranoid about the possibility of outside influence or military intervention, strapped for cash, and obsessed about its position in the international hierarchy, the obvious route might be to either incorporate North Korean nuclear devices (if they actually exist), or build their own, something South Korean technicians could easily accomplish. North Korea, after all, has set the example for economically challenged nations looking for the ultimate in deterrence.

One might argue that clear and firm US security guarantees for a reunified Korea would be able to dissuade any government from choosing the nuclear option. If making decisions based purely on logic the answer would be probably yes. Unfortunately, the recent Korean leadership has established a record of being motivated more by emotional and nationalistic factors than logical or realistic ones. Antics over Dokdo and the Yasukuni Shrine and alienating the US serve as examples. But the continuation of the "Sunshine Policy" tops those.

Instead of admitting they've been sold a dead horse, the Roh administration continued riding the rotting and bloated beast known as the Sunshine Policy, until all that are left today are a pile of bones, a bit of dried skin, and a few tufts of dirty hair. Roh, however, is still in the saddle, if not as firmly after North Korea's recent missile tests.

Japan must then consider its options in countering an openly nuclear, reunified Korea without USFK. Already building momentum to change its constitution to clarify its military, it's not inconceivable that Japan would ultimately consider going nuclear to deter Korea. As in South Korea, there is no technological barrier preventing Japan from building nuclear weapons.

While the details of the race and escalation of tensions can vary in any number of ways and are not inevitable, that an arms race would occur is probable. Only the perception of threat and vulnerability need be present for this to occur. East Asia could become a nuclear powder keg ready to explode over something as childish as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between Korea and Japan, a Diaoyu/Senkakus dispute between China and Japan, or the Koguryo dispute between Korea and China.

The arms race need not occur

One could argue that the US would be able to step in and moderate things before such an escalation could occur. Considering the recent US record on influencing either North or South Korea, it is perhaps unwise to count on it being able to do so at some crucial point in the future. One could also argue that the US need not be involved in a future East Asian war. Like assuming there is no need for USFK since North Korea is considered less of a threat to Seoul, that is wishful thinking. The US has too many political and diplomatic ties, aside from alliance obligations, to ignore such a war. For American policymakers, the notion that a withdrawal is a deserved payback for the rampant anti-Americanism in South Korea, or that the few billion we spend on defense there is a catastrophic waste, need to be discarded. The potential cost of a war would be far greater in both American lives and in dollars, the benefits of continued peace immeasurable.

Vastly reducing or withdrawing USFK can only harm US security, it cannot help it. USFK has helped maintain peace and allowed the US to project influence in the region for the past six decades; removing that presence would be foolish and difficult to replicate once done. It is also important to keep in mind that the next presidential election will likely result in a less anti-American administration.

South Korean policymakers and citizens alike need to come to terms with the fact that Korea will probably never be a powerful nation, but because of its location it will always be important in the geopolitical sense. Because of this, Korea can never take the middle ground or play a "balancing" role; Korea must choose sides.

Finally, the reality that both American and South Korean policymakers need to come to terms with is that USFK deterring a second North Korean invasion has become a secondary mission to maintaining regional stability, even in a reunified Korea.

Corey Richardson is a Washington-based analyst who covered East Asian security issues as a presidential management fellow with the US Department of Defense, and is a co-founder of The Korea Liberator (korealiberator.org), a weblog focused on North Korea. The opinions expressed are his own. He can be reached at richardson@korealiberator.org.